Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

State of Utah v. Earnest Charles Ford : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dee W. Smith; Public Defender Association of Weber County; Attorney for Appellant.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Nathan Lyon;
Deputy Weber County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Ford, No. 20061165 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/7044

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20MHMB5-CA

v.
EARNEST CHARLES FORD,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION ON ONE COUNT EAC
ATTEMPTED MURDER, A FIRST DEGREE FELONYJ
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(2
(WEST SUPP. 2006), AND POSSESSION OR USE1
FIREARM BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH C O D I
§ 76-10-503(2) (a) (WEST 2004), IN THE SEC1
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST,
PRESIDING
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (44,
Assistant Attorney Ga
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4 €j
Attorney General
160 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: (801) 366^
NATHAN LYON
Deputy Weber County!!:4I
Attorneys for AppellalJUHl
DEE W. SMITH
Public Defender Association of Vifeber County
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant
NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY

irnHJilu0TE COURTS
Hit um

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20061165-CA

v.
EARNEST CHARLES FORD,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION ON ONE COUNT EACH OF
ATTEMPTED MURDER, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(a)
(WEST SUPP. 2006), AND POSSESSION OR USE OF A
FIREARM BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-10-503 (2) (a) (WEST 2004), IN THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST,
PRESIDING
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
NATHAN LYON
Deputy Weber County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee
DEE W. SMITH
Public Defender Association of Weber County
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant
NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY BY NOT FILING
A MOTION TO SEVER WHERE SUCH A MOTION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
GRANTED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WAS SO
OVERWHELMING AS TO CREATE NO LIKELIHOOD OF A MORE
FAVORABLE TRIAL OUTCOME
CONCLUSION
NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY

i

8
12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)

9

STATE CASES
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 19l.>9)
State v. HalleLl , ,' 9'.' J1. 2

nt :j)-,

9

|(, l'-i9 ^

State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92

= = ..

. 2

State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App 199" 1

.

^

State v. Seel, 82/ P._d 9 5 4 (Utah App J 9'i ' i
State v. v'os, '-'11117 irr ;,rp. ."'15, 580 Utah Adv. Rep. 20

2

State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App. 295, 55 P.3d 1147

i?

State v. Warren, 779 P.2d 1159 (Wash. App. 1989)
Stale

V.

yvli-L L LJ. ' • ,

i 'J i i , , i

in,

i,, , i

\'l

c

,

...

12

Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-~

9

Utah Code Ann.

1

xx

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20061165-CA

v.
EARNEST CHARLES FORD,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
attempted murder, a first degree felony, and possession or use of
a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony (R. 14849).

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (West 2004) (R. 158, 160).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did trial counsel perform ineffectively by not filing a
motion to sever, where such a motion would not have been granted
because the evidence against defendant was so overwhelming as to
create no likelihood of a more favorable trial outcome for him?
u,

*In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim

based on counsel's failure to seek severance, the defendant must
demonstrate both that the motion should have been granted and "a

reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.'"

State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App

1990)(quoting State v. Warren, 779 P.2d 1159, 1164 (Wash. App.
1989)).

Ineffective assistance presents a question of law,

reviewed on the record of the underlying trial.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, M

See State v.

16-17, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Vos, 2007

UT App. 215, 1 9, 580 Utah Adv. Rep. 20.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are
dispositive in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count
each of attempted murder with injury, a first degree felony, and
possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a
second degree felony (R. 73-74).

A jury convicted him as charged

(R. 89-90; R. 145-46; R. 165: 36). The court sentenced defendant
to a five-to-life term in the Utah State Prison on the first
degree felony, a concurrent one-to-fifteen year term on the
second degree felony, and a consecutive one-year weapons
enhancement (R. 149).

The court ordered this sentence to run

consecutive to the prison sentence defendant was already serving
(Id.).

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 151).

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, a methamphetamine user also known as "Half Pint,"
was just over four feet tall, used wrist crutches to walk, and
breathed with the assistance of a tracheotomy tube and
supplemental oxygen (R. 3; R. 163: 180, 186; R. 164: 100). He
met the victim, Felicia, at a New Year's Eve party (R. 163: 99).
Three weeks later, Felicia visited defendant at his
apartment because, as she explained at trial, "I knew that he
would get me high and that I wouldn't have to pay" (Id. at 101) .
The two smoked crack cocaine together, Felicia aiding defendant
by circling her hand and positioning it against defendant's lips,
and then exhaling the smoke through her hand into his mouth
(Id.).
102).

They smoked "quite a bit" and got "very high" (Id. at
Defendant bought Chinese takeout and they ate.

Afterwards, they drank defendant's tequila, consuming "quite a
bit of the bottle" (Id. at 103).

Felicia then suggested that

they smoke more crack (Id.).
What happened next is not entirely clear.

Felicia testified

that defendant refused to share his crack with her unless she
"shotgunned" the smoke directly into his mouth, without using her
hand as a barrier between their lips (Id. at 103-04). x

She

refused (Id. at 104). According to her, defendant "freaked out" .
at her refusal, and they engaged in an aggressive physical and
1

Ingesting drugs through mouth-to-mouth contact is
sometimes referred to as "shotgunning" or "supercharging."
R. 163: 104.
3

See

verbal fight (Id.).

Felicia testified that defendant "got very

angry and started telling me that I was not going to smoke his
dope for free, that I was a bitch, a whore, a slut, I would not
get away with taking . '. . from him" (Id. ).

In turn, she told

him, among other things, "that I could have someone hurt him"
(Id. at 105). He got up and approached her, she shoved him down
on a bed, he fell to the floor and then grabbed her foot, and
then she kicked him away and left the house (Id. at 105-06).
For his part, defendant told the police that Felicia "thought he
was a punk" and that if she thought she could "come over and
smoke up his . . . shit and then leave, . . .

he wasn't going for

that" (R. 164: 99; accord id. at 29, 70, 77, 83, 89).

Defendant

also maintained that before leaving his apartment, Felicia took
his cell phone, some money, a coat, and a bottle of scotch (Id.
at 68, 99, 111, 116).
Felicia fled about a block away to the home of her cousin,
Edward (R. 163: 107). 2

Both Edward and another cousin testified

that defendant had stopped by the house either earlier that day
or the previous day to warn Felicia "to stay away from him or he
would shoot her punk ass" (Id. at 125; accord id. at 167). 3
According to Edward, when Felicia showed up at his home after the

2

Police officers later found a cell phone, a jacket, a
bottle of scotch, and some money in prescription pill bottles
marked with defendant's name at Edward's home (R. 164: 41, 47,
52-53, 55-56, 58-59).
3

Felicia had not received this message when she visited
defendant at his apartment (R. 163: 125-26, 167).
4

fight with defendant, she asked to be let in and told him that
Half Pint had grabbed her breasts and tried to rape her and that
she had slapped him and told him she wasn't a prostitute (Id. at
127, 145).

She wanted Edward to go back to defendant's apartment

with her to retaliate (Id. at 127, 146). Edward declined,
stating he had "nothing to do with it" (Id. at 127).
Three or four minutes after Felicia arrived, Edward "[h]eard
a truck rumble up the driveway, a horn honk" (Id. at 126).
Telling Felicia to stay in the house, Edward walked outside and
immediately recognized defendant's truck (Id. at 131).
Describing the events as happening "so fast, it was just like a
movie," Edward described seeing defendant, approaching the truck,
and hearing defendant ask, "Where's your punk-assed cousin?" (Id.
at 132-33).

Edward testified that as he walked up to the truck,

"I heard a click, click[,] [a]nd I said, oh, shit, gun. And I
stepped to the side, and out of my peripheral vision I seen
Felicia" (Id. at 133). 4

He continued, "I heard two shots, and

[Felicia] said, Ah, I'm hit, and turned around and ran into the
[house]" (Id.).

He heard a third shot (Id. at 134).

Edward

moved under cover and stayed out of sight until defendant backed
out of the driveway and drove off (Id. at 134-37) .
Inside the home, Felicia had collapsed on the floor,
bleeding profusely.

Nonetheless, she was able to identify

4

Unbeknownst to Edward, Felicia had followed him out of
the house (R. 163: 133).
5

defendant, both by given name and nickname, to police officers
prior to being transported to the hospital (Id. at 180; R. 164:
20).

The surgeon who treated Felicia at the emergency room

testified that she was on "death's doorstep" when she arrived,
having sustained a life-threatening gunshot wound that penetrated
her lung, diaphragm, liver, stomach, and colon and another
gunshot wound to her arm

(R. 164: 7-8, 10-12).

She had lost at

least one-third of her blood volume (Id. at 6, 12). 5
Meanwhile, based on Felicia's identification, police located
defendant at his apartment, where they handcuffed and mirandized
him (Id. at 24-25, 28-29, 76, 96). When one officer told
defendant that Felicia was still alive, he reacted with
"disgust[]" (R. 163: 186). The officer testified, "He let out
what I'd describe as kind of an exasperated breath of air and
kind of a scowl.

He kind of went like — like he'd — he was

pretty disappointed that perhaps she was still alive" (Id.;
accord R. 16 4 : 31) .
After agreeing to a police station interview, defendant
received a second Miranda warning and then spoke with a police
officer (R. 164: 97-99).

Defendant told the officer that he went

to Edward's house with a revolver because he thought he would
find Felicia there (Id. at 100).

5

Defendant drove up to the house

Felicia had spent three and a half months in the hospital
and undergone nine corrective surgeries at the time of trial (R.
163: 109).
6

and called for Edward to come outside (Id.).

According to

defendant, Felicia followed Edward outside, calling defendant a
punk and trying to hit him (Id. at 101).

Defendant reached under

his seat and pulled out the revolver (Id.).

After that,

defendant told the officer, "everything got quiet," and he
remembered nothing further (Id.),

Later, in a written statement,

when asked "Is it possible that you shot [Felicia]?", defendant
responded, "Yes" (Id_^ at 112).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance
because his trial counsel did not move to sever the charge of
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person from the
charge of attempted murder.

He asserts that, absent this

substandard performance, he would have enjoyed a more favorable
trial outcome.

This claim is most easily disposed of on the

prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness analysis, an analytical
approach consistent with the statute governing joinder, which
directs severance when joinder would prejudice defendant.
Here, defendant fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced
when two witnesses saw him commit the crime and he as much as
admitted to it.

He argues only that a "strong possibility" of a

better outcome existed because the "two main witnesses had
credibility issues" (Br. of Aplt. at 19). This argument ignores
the well-settled role of the jury as the sole judge of witness
credibility.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the

7

jury's verdict, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming.
It is for this reason, not the fact of a previous, unspecified
felony conviction, that the jury found him guilty.

Defendant's

conviction, therefore, should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PERFORM
INEFFECTIVELY BY NOT FILING A
MOTION TO SEVER WHERE SUCH A MOTION
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WAS SO
OVERWHELMING AS TO CREATE NO
LIKELIHOOD OF A MORE FAVORABLE
TRIAL OUTCOME
Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial.

He asserts that his counsel performed

deficiently by not moving to sever the charge of possession of a
weapon by a restricted person from the attempted murder charge
(Br. of Aplt. at 13).

He also asserts that he suffered prejudice

because, absent the jury's knowledge of his previous felony
conviction and given the dubious credibility of the witnesses, he
would have enjoyed a "strong possibility" of a more favorable
trial outcome.

Id. at 18-19.

" A In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim
based on counsel's failure to seek severance, the defendant must
demonstrate both that the motion should have been granted and "a
reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.'"

State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App

8

1990)(quoting State v. Warren, 779 P.2d 1159, 1164 (Wash. App.
1989)).
While defendant's claim fails on both prongs of this test
for ineffectiveness, this Court may dispose of it most
efficiently by addressing the prejudice component.

See Parsons

v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1999) (when it is "easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, we will do so without addressing whether
counsel's performance was professionally unreasonable")(quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)) (other
citations omitted).

This approach is consistent with the statute

governing joinder of offenses, which provides for mandatory
severance of charges only when joinder would prejudice defendant:
If the court finds a defendant or the
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses . . . , the court shall order an
election of separate trials of separate
counts, . . . or provide other relief as
justice requires.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4) (a) (West 2004).

To establish

prejudice, "a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to
support

y

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.'" Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694).
Defendant falls well short of meeting this standard.

He

argues only that, absent the stipulation to defendant's prior
conviction, "[t]here is a strong possibility that the outcome for
9

the Defendant would have been more favorable . . . [because t]he
State's two main witnesses had credibility issues."
at 19.

Br. of Aplt.

Defendant's claim fails because the evidence against him

was overwhelming.

See, e.g., State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 958-59

(Utah App 1992)("Since the evidence of defendants' guilt was
overwhelming, the balance was tipped even without the prior
convictions evidence"); State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 385-87
(Utah App 1997)(defendant not prejudiced by joinder where
overwhelming evidence supported both charges).
There is simply no dispute about the critical facts upon
which the jury based its conviction.

Two witnesses reported that

defendant had earlier stopped by Edward's home and
kill Felicia (R. 163: 125-126, 167).

threatened to

Felicia described in detail

fighting physically with defendant just before the shooting (Id.
at 104-06).

For his part, defendant said only that Felicia had

hit and robbed him and that his "mama didn't raise [him] to wear
no girls' panties" (R. 164 at 77, 83, 89, 111).

Felicia,

"visibly upset" after the fight, fled to Edward's house (R. 163
at 107, 127, 152, 165).
at 107, 128).

Defendant showed up minutes later (Id.

Edward came out of the house and immediately

recognized defendant, the sole occupant of the truck (Id. at
131).

Defendant, who admitted that he had a revolver with him,

asked for Felicia (IdL. at 132-33, R. 164: 101, 111). When
Felicia came out of the house, she immediately sustained two
gunshot wounds, one of which almost killed her (Id. at 7-8).

10

Prior to being transported to the hospital, Felicia identified
defendant as the shooter (R. 163: 180; R. 164: 20).

Defendant

admitted that he "possibl[y]" shot Felicia (R. 164: 112).
Under these factual circumstances, there is no possibility
that the jury convicted defendant because it knew that he had a
previous felony conviction.

It convicted him because the

evidence showed beyond any reasonable doubt that he was guilty.
Indeed, defendant offered no viable defense.

He asserted only

that when he arrived in his truck at Edward's house, Edward and
Felicia came outside and punched him in the face, thus justifying
the use of force in return (R. 163: 185; R. 164: 30, 68; R. 165:
24-26).

Notably, however, after telling the police that he had

been punched in the face, defendant then retreated somewhat from
this story, writing in his confession that Felicia "come out [of
the house] calling me a punk and tried

to swing on me" (Statement

of Defendant, at 2 (in manila envelope, unnumbered)(emphasis
added); accord R. 164: 101).

In any event, no physical evidence

corroborated defendant's version of events, and nowhere does he
deny that he shot Felicia (R. 163: 186).

In the end, defendant's

claim that, but for the fact of his previous felony conviction,
he would have enjoyed a more favorable trial outcome, borders on
the frivolous.
Moreover, counsel did not render deficient performance by
not moving to sever because the evidence of defendant's
culpability was so overwhelming—and the concomitant lack of

11

prejudice so clear—that the trial court plainly would have denied
the motion.

Because counsel could not have established that

joinder would harm defendant and thus mandate severance, filing a
motion to sever would thus have been futile.

See State v.

Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, 5 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that
"failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective
assistance.")(citation omitted); State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 1
34, 989 P.2d 52 (same).

For this additional reason, his claim

fails.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count each of attempted murder, a first degree
felony, and possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a second degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj_

day of August, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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